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Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How
Can National Governments Address a Global
Problem?
Robert N. Stavinst
Concerns about global climate change due to the greenhouse
effect have led policymakers from many countries to consider
ways of limiting emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions associated with the generation of
energy from fossil fuels.1 Although there still is much debate
about the desirability of limiting C02 and other greenhouse gas
emissions, it is important to consider policy instruments that
may be able to meet forthcoming targets.2 In a recent essay,
Professor Schmalensee convincingly argues that "the creation of
durable institutions and frameworks seems both logically prior to
and more important than the choice of a particular policy pro-
gram that will almost surely be viewed as too strong or too weak
within a decade."3 My primary purpose in this Article is to ex-
t Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Uni.-
versity, and University Fellow, Resources for the Future. This paper has benefitted frora
comments by Don Fullerton, Lawrence Goulder, Robert Keohane, and Richard
Schmalensee. It draws, in part, upon B.S. Fisher, et al, An Economic Assessment of Policy
Instruments for Combating Climate Change, in James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, and Erik F.
Haites, eds, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change
397 (Cambridge 1996), but the present author is solely responsible for any errors.
1 Since pre-industrial times, CO. has been the most important anthropogenic source
of radiative forcing (the so-called "greenhouse effect"), accounting for about 60 percent of
the forcing. Anthropogenic emissions of methane and nitrous oxide account for 15 percent
and 5 percent, respectively. Other, less important greenhouse gases include tropospheric
ozone (whose chemical precursors include nitrogen oxides, non-methane hydrocarbons,
and carbon monoxide), halocarbons (including HCFC's and HFC's), and sulfate aerosol.
J.T. Houghton, et al, eds, Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change 1-7
(Cambridge 1996).
2 In May 1992, at the "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro, 154 nations agreed to adopt
the Framework Convention on Climate Change. For a comprehensive review of the
Convention, see Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale J Intl L 451 (1993). InJuly 1996, the Undersecretary (if
State for Global Affairs, Timothy E. Wirth, stated at United Nations-sponsored talks in
Geneva that the Clinton Administration was committed to seeking binding international
limits on greenhouse gas emissions. John H. Cushman, Jr., In Shift, U.S. Will Seek
Binding World Pact to Combat Global Warming, NY Times A6 (July 17, 1996).
3 Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architecture and Institutions 8 (Paper
Presented for NBER Conference "Economics and Policy Issues in Global Warming: An
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plore frameworks and instruments that individual nations and
groups of nations can adopt and to achieve goals that may be
specified by future "policy programs." This exploration strongly
reaffirms that institutional dimensions of the global climate
change policy problem are exceptionally important.
I begin-in Part I of this Article-by considering some crite-
ria for assessing policy instruments and by describing the major
alternative instruments available. In Parts II and III, respective-
ly, I review conventional regulatory and market-based instru-
ments. In Part IV, I focus on implementation issues; in Part V, I
provide a comparative assessment of instruments; and in Part
VI, I offer some conclusions.
I. THE MENU OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Two distinct categories of policy instruments are pertinent to
global climate change. First, domestic policy instruments seek to
enable individual nations to achieve their specific targets or
goals. Second, international (bilateral, multilateral, or global)
instruments can be employed jointly by groups of nations.
By necessity, I investigate both domestic and international
instruments. While national environmental policy actions are
prevalent, we are much less familiar with successful environmen-
tal initiatives at the international level. The "exceptions that may
prove the rule" include the successful agreements for stratospher-
ic ozone and the somewhat less successful international whaling
agreements. In the case of global climate change, the challenges
are significantly greater than either of those experiences might
suggest.
Stringent climate change policies will be adopted by individ-
ual nations only insofar as those nations perceive that positive
net benefits-including international transfers-will be forthcom-
ing.4 This general point has been made in the starkest terms by
Professors Nordhaus and Yang: "It is single nations, not the
United Nations, that determine energy and environmental policy,
so any grand design to slow global warming must be translated
into national measures."' On the other hand, there is little doubt
Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel Report," 1996).
Geoffrey Heal, Formation of International Environmental Agreements, in Carlo
Carraro, ed, Trade, Innovation, Environment 301 (Kluwer 1994); Carlo Carraro and
Domenico Siniscalco, Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment, 52 J
Pub Econ 309, 323-28 (1993).
' William D. Nordhaus and Zili Yang, A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium
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that successful policies to address this truly global environmental
problem will require the adoption of international agreements.
Hence, both domestic and international policy instruments must
be considered.
A. Criteria for Instrument Choice
From an economic perspective, the first candidate criterion
for instrument assessment should probably be relative efficiency,
or the degree to which instruments are capable of maximizing
net benefits.6 But the efficiency criterion can be problematic,
because it requires not only knowledge of the costs of abatement,
but knowledge of the benefits of abatement. And the latter re-
quires an understanding of both the physical consequences of
climate change and the economic valuation of those consequenc-
es. This information burden is overwhelming in many circum-
stances, as it surely is in the current global climate context. In-
stead, the less ambitious criterion of cost-effectiveness has often
been used. This criterion entails seeking a policy instrument to
achieve a given target or goal (which may or may not represent
the efficient level of control) at minimum aggregate cost of abate-
ment.7
Regardless of whether one employs the efficiency criterion or
the cost-effectiveness criterion, costs must be measured correctly.
This is easier said than done, since the full costs of environmen-
tal regulation are mutifaceted (see Table 1).' Many policymakers
and much of the general public would identify the on-budget
costs to government of administering environmental laws and
regulations as the cost of environmental regulation. Most ana-
lysts, however, would consider the direct capital and operating
Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies, 86 Am Econ Rev 741, 742 (1996).
6 The "efficient" level of abatement is the level at which the difference between ben-
efits and costs is maximized. If the benefit and cost functions are shaped as they are typ-
ically believed to be, then this efficient level occurs at the point where marginal benefits
equal marginal costs. William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environ-
mental Policy 35-56 (Cambridge 1988).
The "cost-effective" allocation of the pollution-control burden among sources is that
allocation for which all sources are controlling at the same marginal abatement cost. Id.
' For a useful decomposition and analysis of the full costs of environmental regula-
tion, see Richard Schmalensee, The Costs of Environmental Protection, in American
Council for Capital Formation Center for Policy Research, Balancing Economic Growth &
Environmental Goals 55 (ACCF 1994). Conceptually, the cost of an environmental regula-
tion is equal to the change in consumer and producer surpluses due directly to the regula-
tion and due to any price or income changes that also result from the regulation. Maureen
L. Cropper and Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J Econ Litera-
ture 675, 721 (1992).
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expenditure associated with regulatory compliance to be the
fundamental element of the overall cost of regulation.' Addition-
al direct costs include legal and other transaction costs, the ef-
fects of refocused management attention, and disrupted produc-
tion. "Negative costs" (in other words, non-environmental bene-
fits) of environmental regulation, including the productivity im-
pacts of a cleaner environment and the potential effects on inno-
vations of regulation should, in theory, also be considered. Gener-
al equilibrium effects associated with product substitution, dis-
couraged investment, and retarded innovation constitute another
important layer of costs, as do the transition costs of real-world
economies responding over time to regulatory changes. Finally,
some social impacts are given substantial weight in political
forums, including those on local employment levels and economic
security. 0 Thus, correctly assessing cost effectiveness is by no
means a trivial task.
Other criteria can also be very important in comparing policy
instruments. Individual nations will inevitably choose their own
sets of criteria (explicitly or implicitly) to distinguish among
alternative policy instruments. Although these chosen criteria
will reflect individual socioeconomic and cultural contexts, in
many cases, nations will consider such factors as the probability
that their environmental goal will be achieved; efficiency or cost-
effectiveness; dynamic incentives for innovation and the diffusion
of improved technologies; flexibility and adaptability to exoge-
nous changes in technology, resource use, and consumer tastes;
distributional equity;" and feasibility in terms of political imple-
These direct costs are typically borne by the private sector, although a substantial
share of compliance costs for a minority of environmental regulations falls on government
rather than on private firms. An example of the latter is the regulation of contaminants in
drinking water under the U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act. 42 USC § 300f et seq (1994 &
Supp 1996).
10 For a fuller explanation of these different categories of the costs of environmental pro-
tection, see Adam B. Jaffe, et al, Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of
U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J Econ Literature 132 (1995).
" It is widely recognized that issues of distributional equity-both among nations
and intertemporally-are central concerns affecting the identification of the time path of
appropriate aggregate levels of greenhouse policy action and the appropriate distribution
of that burden among the nations of the world. In particular, because of the significant
coal resources of China and India and because of their relatively high rates of economic
and population growth, it is frequently suggested that massive resource transfers from
the industrialized countries to some developing nations will be a necessary ingredient for
a successful global greenhouse agreement. Hence, in the present context, the use of a
distributional equity criterion essentially means that we need to ask to what degree al-
ternative policy instruments can facilitate such transfers. I address this in the case of
"international policy instruments" below, in Part II.C. The evidence from existing institu-
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mentation and administration. Several of these crite-
ria-including efficiency, cost-effectiveness, dynamic effects on
technological change, distributional equity, and political feasibil-
ity-are particularly important in the climate change context.
B. Domestic Policy Instruments
The most common approach, which virtually all countries of
the world use to address environmental problems, has been to set
standards and to directly regulate the activities of firms and
individuals. This approach involves so-called command-and-con-
trol instruments (see Table 2). Conceivably, such an approach
could be used in the greenhouse context as well. By mandating
standards, governments could ban or attempt to alter the use of
materials and equipment considered harmful. For example, gov-
ernments could apply standards to the energy efficiency of build-
ings, to fuel use by motor vehicles, to the energy efficiency of
household durables, and to fuel content.
In contrast, market-based instruments have recently been
employed by governments to alter price signals in order to ensure
that polluters face direct cost incentives to control emissions. The
primary market-based instruments to be considered for green-
house management are taxes and tradeable permits. Under a
true emissions tax, a charge is imposed per unit of pollutant
discharge.12 A closely related application would be to tax the
carbon content of fossil fuels. As an alternative, under an emis-
sion trading scheme, sources receive permits to emit, and can
then buy and sell these permits among one another. 3 Because
these market-based instruments induce decisionmaking units
(typically firms) to choose control levels at which their marginal
abatement costs are the same, overall pollution abatement costs
tional experience is not promising. Barbara Connolly, Increments for the Earth: The Poli-
tics of Environmental Aid, in Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, 6ds, Institutions for
Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promise 327 (MIT 1996).
2 The development of the notion of a corrective tax on pollution is generally credited
to Arthur C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 28-30 (Macmillan 4th ed 1938).
" The initial proposal for a system of tradeable permits to control pollution was by
John H. Dales, Pollution, Property, and Prices 77-100 (Toronto 1968), and first formalized
by W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5
J Econ Theory 395 (1972), although much of the literature can be traced back to R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 41-44 (1960).
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will, in theory, be minimized. 4 That is, market-based instru-
ments can, in principle, be cost effective.
C. International Policy Instruments
Climate change is truly a global commons problem. Because
the location of greenhouse gas emissions does not affect the glob-
al distribution of damages, free-riding problems plague unilateral
or multilateral "solutions." Further, nations will not benefit pro-
portionately from greenhouse-gas abatement policies. In fact,
some countries-such as Canada and Russia-might experience
no benefits from control, since they actually stand to gain from
global climate change (due to the effects of increased tempera-
tures and precipitation on agricultural production). Thus, for
some countries, costs of control may exceed benefits. This means
that for a voluntary international agreement to be successful, it
must include a mechanism for transferring gains to countries
that would otherwise not benefit from joining an agreement. This
is a central challenge for any international policy instrument
that seeks to allocate responsibility among nations.
It may be possible to impose uniform standards on countries
participating in an international emissions-reduction agreement.
It would be difficult, however, to achieve wide agreement about
any large set of specific instruments, because such approaches
would place severe limits on individual countries' domestic policy
choices. An alternative regulatory approach would require coun-
tries to agree on fixed national emission levels. But marginal
abatement costs would then vary greatly among participating
countries, and total global abatement costs would thus be much
greater than necessary.
Instead, some degree of aggregate cost-effectiveness could be
achieved if market-based instruments were employed interna-
tionally. Four possibilities stand out. First, if countries agreed to
, Because the costs of controlling pollution vary greatly among and within firms, any
given aggregate pollution control level can be met at minimum aggregate control cost only
if pollution sources control at the same marginal cost, as opposed to the same emission
level. Indeed, depending on the age and location of emission sources and available technol-
ogies, the cost of controlling a unit of a given pollutant may vary by a factor of one hun-
dred or more among sources. Robert W. Crandall, The Political Economy of Clean Air:
Practical Constraints on White House Review, in V. Kerry Smith, ed, Environmental Policy
under Reagan's Executive Order: The Role of Benefit-Cost Analysis 205, 209-19 (North
Carolina 1984). Such cost heterogeneity is characteristic of carbon abatement linked with
fuel switching and energy-efficiency enhancement as well as carbon sequestration linked
with changes in land use.
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apply the same level of domestic greenhouse taxes (harmonized
domestic taxes), marginal abatement costs would tend to be
equalized among countries. Second, a uniform international tax
on greenhouse emissions could be imposed, with total tax reve-
nue allocated among participating countries according to a given
set of rules.
A third potentially cost-effective approach would be a system
of international tradeable permits, in particular, a system of
tradeable carbon rights, the total allocation of which would re-
flect the overall emissions target. International permit trade
would establish a market price-an implicit international tax
rate-that would equate marginal abatement costs among coun-
tries. Theoretically, such permits would lead to a cost-effective
solution. In the context of such an international tradeable permit
scheme, participating countries would be free to choose any do-
mestic policy instruments that could achieve their permit-deter-
mined targets. For example, they might employ domestic trade-
able permits, domestic taxes, or conventional regulations. "
A fourth market-based instrument, closely related to the
concept of international tradeable permits, is joint implementa-
tion, which is essentially bilateral trading arranged on an ad hoc
basis. This policy mechanism, which I also consider below, has
received considerable attention in recent years from policy mak-
ers and others.
All of these international instruments require us to remem-
ber that no world government--or any other institution-appears
capable of administering, monitoring, and enforcing truly inter-
national instruments."5 We return to that critical issue later.
II. REGULATIONS, VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER
NON-MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS
The conventional approach to environmental policy in virtu-
ally all countries has been to employ policy instruments in the
form of uniform standards or voluntary programs to improve the
environment. 7 Both approaches are prominent in both current
" As I discuss later, with a domestic tax there is uncertainty regarding the quantity
of emissions reductions that will be induced. Given this caveat, any of a variety of price or
quantity instruments can be used domestically if a tradeable permit system is used to
allocate targets internationally.
G Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architecture and Institutions (Paper
Presented for NBER Conference "Economics and Policy Issues in Global Warming: An
Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel Report," 1996).
"7 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Instruments
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and proposed policy measures to address global climate
change.18
A. Uniform Technology and Performance Standards
Conventional regulatory standards (often described as "com-
mand-and-control" regulations) can loosely be categorized as
either technology-based or performance-based, although the dis-
tinction is often not clear. Technology-based (or design) standards
typically require specified equipment, processes, or procedures. In
the context of climate change policy, such standards might re-
quire, for example, that firms use particular types of energy-
efficient motors, combustion processes, or landfill gas collection
technologies.
Performance-based standards are more flexible than technol-
ogy-based standards in that they specify allowable levels of pol-
lutant emissions or polluting activities but permit regulated
entities to choose the way in which they will achieve these levels.
Examples of uniform performance standards for greenhouse gas
abatement include maximum allowable levels of CO2 emissions
from combustion or maximum levels of methane emissions from
landfills. Uniform standards can also take the form of outright
bans of certain products or processes, such as the banning of
aerosol sprays that contain ozone-depleting substances."9
Although uniform technology and performance standards can
be effective in achieving established environmental goals and
standards, they tend to lead to non-cost-effective outcomes in
which firms use unduly expensive means to control pollution.'
Nonetheless, because performance standards give economic
for Environmental Protection 31-33 (OECD 1989); Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins,
Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 Ecol L Q 1,
5-7 (1991); William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy
15a (Cambridge 1988).
" In the case of the United States, for example, see U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate (Draft Report to Congress VIII-1-87,
February 1989); National Academy of Sciences, et al, Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warm-
ing: Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base 73-83 (National Academy 1992); and Wil-
liam J. Clinton and Albert Gore, Jr., The Climate Change Action Plan (EPA 1993).
" Although prohibitions may be the least flexible form of regulation, if low-cost sub-
stitutes for targeted products are available, bans can turn out to be a relatively cost-ef-
fective policy instrument.
o Thomas H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution
Policy 14-16 (Resources for the Future 1985); Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for
Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J Econ Persp
95, 96-97 (Spring 1989); Hahn and Stavins, 18 Ecol L Q at 5-7 (cited in note 17).
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agents flexibility to make choices based partly on economic crite-
ria, performance-based standards will generally be more cost-
effective than technology-based standards. On the other hand, if
there essentially is only one way to achieve a particular perfor-
mance standard, a technology-based standard may help conserve
information and administration costs.
In theory, the government could achieve a cost-effective allo-
cation of pollution control responsibility among sources if it as-
signed source-specific control levels that equated marginal costs
of control. But this approach would require information about the
pollution control cost functions of individual firms and sourc-
es-information that governments usually lack and could obtain
only at great cost, if at all.2
Even if the government could use conventional technology or
uniform performance standards to achieve a cost-effective alloca-
tion of pollution control at present, such standards would not
provide dynamic incentives for the development, adoption, and
diffusion of environmentally and economically superior control
technologies.' Once a performance standard has been satisfied,
an individual firm can gain little from developing or adopting
cleaner technology. In addition, regulated firms may fear that
adopting a superior technology will cause performance standards
to be tightened. Technology standards are even worse than per-
formance standards in inhibiting innovation, since, by their very
21 Source-specific or firm-specific permit programs are one approach traditionally
taken to adjust regulatory standards to individual circumstances. If pollutants exhibit
highly localized effects, such an approach can have distinct advantages over a tax or
permit system, but global climate change is obviously not a localized problem.
'2 Performance and technology standards can be designed to be "technology forcing,"
mandating performance levels that are not currently viewed as technologically feasible or
mandating technologies that are not fully developed. Eberhard Jochem and Edelgard
Gruber, Obstacles to Rational Electricity Use and Measures to Alleviate Them, Energy Pol
340, 348 (May 1990). But while regulators can typically assume that some amount of
improvement over existing technology will always be feasible, it is impossible to know just
how much. Standards must either be made unambitious or run the risk of being
unachievable. A. Myrick Freeman III and Robert H. Haveman, Water Pollution Control,
River Basin Authorities, and Economic Incentives: Some Current Policy Issues, 19 Pub Pol
53 (1971). See also Adam B. Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins, Dynamic Incentives of Environ-
mental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion,
29 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-43 (1995); Peter Bohm and Clifford S. Russell, Comparative
Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in Allen V. Kneese and James L. Sweeney, eds,
Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics 395 (Elsevier Science 1985); Rich-
ard G. Newell, Adam B. Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Policy and Technolo-
gy Change: The Effect of Economic Incentives on Direct Regulation on Energy-Saving
Innovation (working paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
1996).
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nature, they constrain the technological choices available, and
may thereby remove all incentives to develop environmentally
beneficial technologies. 3 Finally, although technology-based
standards may seem to be the least cost-effective of policy instru-
ments, alternative instruments can be relatively attractive if
monitoring costs are sufficiently high.24
B. Voluntary Agreements
In addition to mandatory policy instruments, voluntary
agreements can play significant roles in greenhouse gas reduction
strategies, and the threat of mandatory government intervention
may sometimes be enough to encourage voluntary agreements.
Firms may try to control greenhouse gas emissions if they fear
more costly mandatory controls in the absence of these voluntary
reductions. This may help explain why voluntary agreements
have already arisen. The vast majority of planned greenhouse gas
reductions from the actions announced or expanded through the
U.S. Climate Change Action Plan' were associated with volun-
tary initiatives aimed at increasing energy efficiency.2"
III. MARKET BASED POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Because of the great potential costs of meeting greenhouse
gas emission targets,27 considerable attention has been given to
the possible use of market-based instruments, which can offer
cost-effective alternatives, provide dynamic incentives for techno-
logical change, and address concerns about distributional equi-
ty.2" At the greatest level of abstraction, in a perfectly competi-
' Under some circumstances, however, a performance standard may provide greater
incentives for technological adoption than a market-based system. David A. Malueg,
Welfare Consequences of Emission Credit Trading Programs, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 66,
72-73 (1990). See also Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on
Innovation, 43 L & Contemp Probs 4, 17-20 (Winter-Spring 1979).
24 For discussions of relevant enforcement issues, see Jon D. Harford, Firm Behavior
Under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes, 5 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 26
(1978); Hirofumi Shibata and J. Steven Winrich, Control of Pollution when the Offended
Defend Themselves, 50 Economica 425 (1983); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell,
The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am Econ Rev
880 (1979).
Clinton and Gore, The Climate Change Action Plan (cited in note 18).
26 Significantly, it is now recognized that this diverse set of voluntary programs will
fail to enable the United States to meet its announced targets.
27 John P. Weyant, Costs of Reducing Global Carbon Emissions, 7 J Econ Persp 27,
42-43 (Fall 1993).
2' There is extensive literature on the principles underlying the use of market-based
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tive market place, an emissions tax or tradeable permit scheme
would allow polluters to reduce emissions up to the point where
the marginal cost of control equals the emissions tax rate or the
equilibrium price of an emissions permit. Both instruments
would promote dynamic efficiency, as each provides a continuous
incentive for adopting better abatement technologies. This Article
will consider five market-based instruments. Two are in the do-
mestic context: carbon taxes and tradeable carbon rights. Three
are international: carbon taxes, tradeable permits, and joint
implementation.
A. Domestic Carbon Taxes
A carbon tax is not a perfect proxy for a tax on CO2 emis-
sions, because a carbon tax on fossil fuels provides an incentive
to reduce the use of carbon-based fuels, but not to reduce CO2
emissions by chemical fixation (scrubbing) and disposal. Since
feasible means of the latter are severely limited,' however, this
is not a significant defect of a carbon tax. Hence, the carbon
content of primary fossil fuels would be the most practicable base
for a CO2 tax system. ° In addition, one form of atmospheric car-
policy instruments for greenhouse management. See, for example, Peter Bohm and
Clifford S. Russell, Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in Allen V.
Kneese and James L. Sweeney, eds, Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics
395 (Elsevier Science 1985); William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of
Environmental Policy 177-89 (Cambridge 1988).; Robert N. Stavins, ed, Project 88-Har-
nessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environment: Initiatives for the New President
(Public Policy Study Sponsored by Senators Timothy E. Wirth and John Heinz, 1988);
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Instruments for En-
vironmental Protection 88-101 (OECD 1989); Thomas H. Tietenberg, Economic Instru-
ments for Environmental Regulation 6 Oxford Rev Econ Pol 17 (Spring 1990); Joshua M.
Epstein and Raj Gupta, Controlling the Greenhouse Effect: Five Global Regimes Compared
18-32 (Brookings 1990); Rudiger Dornbusch and James M. Poterba, eds, Global Warming:
Economic Policy Responses 52-54 (MIT 1991); Robert N. Stavins, Project 88-Round II,
Incentives for Action: Designing Market-Based Environmental Strategies (Public Policy
Study sponsored by Senators Timothy E. Wirth and John Heinz, 1991); Maureen L. Crop-
per and Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J Econ Literature 675,
689-92 (1992); and Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Trading in Greenhouse Per-
mits: A Critical Examination of Design and Implementation Issues, in Henry Lee, ed,
Shaping National Responses to Climate Change 177 (Island 1995).
' C.J. Jepma, et al, A Generic Assessment of Response Options, in James P. Bruce,
Hoesung Lee, and Erik F. Haites, eds, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimen-
sions of Climate Change 225 (Cambridge 1996).
For further commentary on the appropriate base of a CO2 tax, see David Pearce,
The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming, 101 Econ J 938, 945 (1991);
Dale W. Jorgenson and Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Economic Effects of a Carbon Tax, in
Akihivo Amano, et al, eds, Climate Change: Policy Instruments and Their Implications 60
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1994); Robert Repetto, et al, Green Fees:
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1
bon removal is quite feasible technologically: carbon sequestra-
tion through forestation and retarded deforestation. Since this
approach may be competitive (on a marginal cost basis) with
emissions abatement in some countries, at least at low levels of
aggregate abatement,81 policy instruments that will provide ap-
propriate incentives for adoption of a cost-effective portfolio of
both emissions reductions and sequestration increases are desir-
able. Carbon taxes could hence be combined with sequestration
tax credits.32
There are a significant number of points in the "product
cycle" of fossil fuels at which a carbon tax could conceivably be
applied, ranging from primary fuel extraction to product and
service end use. Energy generation from fossil fuels is obviously
the point at which emissions occur, but there would be far fewer
monitoring points and hence lower implementation costs if car-
bon contents were measured and if the carbon tax were applied
to wholesale use. A carbon tax would reduce energy-sector CO2
emissions more efficiently than would taxes levied on some other
basis, such as energy content of fuels or the value of energy prod-
ucts. Indeed, simulations indicate that an energy (BTU) tax could
be between 20 and 40 percent more costly, and an ad valorem tax
two to three times more costly, than a carbon tax for equivalent
reductions in emissions."
The abatement achieved by a carbon tax and the economic
effect of the tax will depend partly on what is done with the tax
revenue. There is widespread agreement that revenue recycling
How a Tax Shift Can Work for the Environment and the Environment 54 (World Research
Institute 1992); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Climate
Change: Designing a Practical Tax System 127 (OECD 1992); Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Climate Change: Designing a Tradeable Permit System
(OECD 1992); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International
Economic Instruments and Climate Change 56 (OECD 1993); Roy Boyd, Kerry Krutilla,
and W. Kip Viscusi, Energy Taxation as a Policy Instrument to Reduce CO, Emissions: A
Net Benefit Analysis, 29 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 1, 10-12 (1995).
S Robert N. Stavins, Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice, 30 J
Envir Econ & Mgmt 218 (1996); Kenneth R. Richards, Robert J. Moulton, and Richard A.
Birdsey, Costs of Creating Carbon Sinks in the U.S., 34 Energy Conservation Mgmt 905
(1993); J.M. Callaway and Bruce McCarl, The Economic Consequences of Substituting Car-
bon Payments for Crop Subsidies in U.S. Agriculture, 7 Envir & Resource Econ 15 (1996).
32 For economic efficiency reasons, these sequestration tax credits might take the
form of a combination of taxes on deforestation and tax credits or subsidies for forestation
(land-use changes). See Robert N. Stavins, The Costs of Carbon Sequestration: A Revealed
Preference Approach 9 (Resources for the Future 1995).
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, The Economic Effects of a Carbon Tax (cited in note 30);
Joel D. Scheraga and Neil A. Leary, Improving the Efficiency of Policies to Reduce CO.
Emissions, Energy Pol 394, 397-99 (May 1992).
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(that is, using revenues to lower other taxes) can significantly
lower the costs of a carbon tax. 4 Some researchers have sug-
gested, moreover, that all of the abatement costs associated with
a carbon tax can be eliminated through revenue recycling in the
form of cuts in taxes on labor.35 There is an emerging consensus,
however, that rejects this stronger claim." Indeed, carbon and
other energy-related taxes can exacerbate distortions associated
with remaining taxes on investment or labor.
B. Domestic Tradeable Permits
An important theoretical attribute of a domestic tradeable
permit scheme is that whatever the initial permit allocation, the
final allocation after trading will be the one that minimizes the
cost of reducing emissions.37 Firms will want to buy permits if
abatement costs exceed the permit price; in the opposite case,
they will want to sell permits. In this way, trade will continue
until all firms are indifferent between buying and selling per-
mits, that is, between marginal abatement and additional fossil
fuel use. When this state is reached, marginal abatement costs
are equated, and an ex post allocation of permits that minimizes
the costs of reducing emissions is achieved.
The most reasonable basis for a domestic tradeable permit
system to control CO2 emissions would be parallel to the carbon
tax system already discussed, that is, a system of tradeable car-
bon rights not unlike the tradeable lead rights used in the Unit-
ed States in the 1980s to phase down the lead content of gaso-
line. A national government could issue permits to wholesale
dealers in fossil fuels or producers and importers of fossil fuels
and allow them to trade in a national permit market." Also, as
' Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, The Economic Effects of a Carbon Tax (cited in note 30);
Lawrence H. Goulder, Effects on Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions:
An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis, 29 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 271, 292-95
(1995).
Repetto, Green Fees at 59-60 (cited in note 30).
3' A. Lans Bovenberg and Ruud A. de Mooij, Environmental Levies and Distortionary
Taxation, 84 Am Econ Rev 1085 (1994); A. Lana Bovenberg and Lawrence H. Golder,
Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other Taxes: General-Equilibrium
Analyses, 86 Am Econ Rev 985 (1996).
"7 As I discuss later, transaction costs reduce trading levels and increase abatement
costs. In some cases, equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs will
be sensitive to initial permit distributions. Thus, in the presence of transaction costs, the
initial distribution of permits can matter in terms of efficiency, not only in terms of
equity. Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J Envir Econ &
Mgmt 133, 146 (1995).
' The government could also allow permit holders to trade directly on an existing in-
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with carbon tax/credit programs, tradeable permit programs
could-in theory-be designed to give appropriate credit to car-
bon sequestration through forestation.89
A government might choose one of two ways to distribute
permits to individual firms. First, firms can be given shares of
the total permit volume, based on some historical record
("grandfathering") such as recent fossil fuel sales. Second, the
government can auction permits. It is also possible to combine
these two approaches. Grandfathering involves a transfer of
wealth, equal to the value of the permits, to existing firms,
whereas with an auction, this wealth is transferred to the gov-
ernment. In fact, the government would-in theory---collect reve-
nue identical with that from a domestic tax producing the same
volume of emissions abatement.
As with tax receipts, auction revenues could be used to re-
duce pre-existing distortionary taxes. In principle, the same is-
sues apply, regardless of whether one uses a tax or tradeable
permit scheme.40 Like pollution taxes, tradeable permits raise
the costs of produced goods relative to labor, and thereby intro-
duce efficiency costs in labor markets.41 This is the case for both
grandfathered and auctioned permits. Some of these costs, how-
ever, can be offset when permits are auctioned and when reve-
nues are used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes. When
costs are offset by using revenues in this way, the government
takes the rents generated by the permit program and-rather
than leaving those rents in private hands-devotes them to re-
ducing distortionary taxes.4
ternational market. Alternatively, to the extent that both international permit and domes-
tic permit markets existed for a particular country, the government could trade on the
international market and set a definite or preliminary domestic limit on the volume of
domestic permits for some period ahead.
' An interesting attribute of a tradeable permit system-whether domestic or inter-
national-is that the market prices of permits that emerge can provide exceptionally
useful feedback to policymakers, since these market prices will reflect the underlying
marginal abatement/sequestration cost functions of sources. Gary W. Yohe, Personal
Position on the Appropriate Policy Response to Global Change (Prepared for ACCF Sympo-
sium at the National Press Club, Sept 11, 1996).
,' Peter Bohm, Government Revenue Implications of Carbon Taxes and Tradeable
Carbon Permits: Efficiency Aspects (paper presented at IIPF, 50th Congress, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Aug 22-25, 1994) ("Government Revenue Implications").
" Lawrence H. Goulder, Ian W.H. Parry, and Dallas Burtraw, Environmental Con-
trols, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-Existing Distributions (paper presented at the NBER Work-
shop, "Public Policy.and the Environment," Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 31, 1996).
42 Don Fullerton and Gilbert Metcalf, A Second-Best Problem for Environmental
Taxation (paper presented at NBER workshop, "Public Policy and the Environment,"
Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 31, 1996).
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To date, most.tradeable permit systems have used perpetu-
ities, but there are several reasons why a system of time-limited
permits could be used for climate change. First, if permits are
initially grandfathered, time-limited permits can reduce the anti-
competitive effects of entry barriers. Second, time-limited permits
can facilitate any potential future changes of emissions targets in
response to new information. The government can retain owner-
ship of permits, leasing them to firms for fixed periods.43 Allow-
ing permits to be banked, or allowing permits for emissions dur-
ing a given period to be used at a later date, is important for
both the efficiency and political acceptability of tradeable permit
schemes.
In contrast with other market-based environmental policy
instruments, tradeable permit schemes have been used, particu-
larly in the United States." Beginning in the 1970s, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) offered the option of
employing variants of tradeable permits to control localized, crite-
ria air pollutants." More significantly, tradeable permit systems
were used in the 1980s to accomplish the phasedown of lead in
gasoline" and to facilitate the phasedown of ozone-depleting
chlorofluorocarbons."' In the 1990s, they are being used to cut
nationwide sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions by 50 percent by the
year 2005," to achieve ambient ozone reductions in the North-
east, and to implement stricter local air pollution controls in the
Los Angeles metropolitan region.
When permits are leased by the government or when time-limited permits are auc-
tioned by the government, the revenue implications of permit schemes approach those of
taxes. This is not the case where eternal permits are auctioned by government. Bohm,
Government Revenue Implications (cited in note 40).
" This is not to suggest that taxes have never been utilized in the context of environ-
mental policies. The Superfund program, for example, is financed primarily through a tax
on petroleum and chemical feedstocks. Since 1990, the United States has also levied a tax
on stratospheric ozone-depleting chemicals. J. Andrew Hoerner, Taxing Pollution, in
Elizabeth Cook, ed, Ozone Protection in the United States 39 (World Resources Institute
1996). For a comprehensive review of "environmental taxes" (broadly defined), see Thomas
A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of Environmental Excise Taxes, 8 J Econ Persp 133
(Winter 1994).
' Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the
Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J Econ Persp 95, 106 (Spring 1989).
" Suzi Kerr and David Mare, Efficient Regulation through Tradeable Permit Markets:
The United States Lead Phasedown (University of Maryland Working Paper 96-06, 1997).
7 David Lee, Trading Pollution, in Cook, ed, Ozone Protection in the United States 31
(cited in note 44).
"' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1995 Compliance Results: Acid Rain
Program (Report No 430-R-96-012, 1996).
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C. International Carbon Taxes
Because international action will be necessary to meet any
significant global emissions target, it is important to consider
international policy instruments that groups of nations (or the
entire globe) can employ. One possibility is for an international
agency to impose a carbon tax. The supporting agreement would
have to specify tax rates as well as a formula for allocating the
tax revenues. Cost-effectiveness would demand a uniform tax
rate applied across all countries (assuming full participation).
Reallocation of revenues need not hamper cost-effectiveness. It is
unclear, however, what international agency could actually im-
pose and enforce such a tax. A set of harmonized domestic carbon
taxes offers an alternative to an international carbon tax. In this
case, an agreement would stipulate that all countries should levy
the same domestic carbon taxes. In either case, some experimen-
tation could be required to set the tax rate to achieve the
coalition's emissions target. The tax rate would also need to be
adjusted over time as economic conditions change.
The uniformity of tax rates is necessary for cost-effective-
ness, but the resulting distribution of costs may certainly not
conform with principles of distributional equity. As a result,
there may be calls for significant resource transfers. Under a
harmonized tax system, an agreement could include fixed lump-
sum payments from rich to poor countries, and under an interna-
tional tax system, an agreement could specify shares of the total
international tax revenues that go to participating countries.49
D. International Tradeable Permits
Under an international tradeable permit scheme, all coalition
countries would be allocated permits for "net emissions," that is,
emissions minus sequestration. A permit could define a right to a
perpetuity or a right to emit a given volume over some time peri-
od. In each period, countries would be free to buy and sell per-
mits on an international exchange. Limiting the temporal dura-
tion of permits could help lend credibility to the system by de-
creasing the possibility that governments would sell permits
(part of a nation's wealth) to a degree that would not be honored
by future governments in those same countries. Time-limited
" Michael Hoel, Harmonzization of Carbon Taxes in International Climate Agree-
ments, 3 Envir & Resource Econ 221 (1993).
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permits could also reduce the risk of large countries gaining
market power on the permit market.
Negotiations on initial permit allocations are likely to involve
such criteria as gross national product (GNP), real GNP, popula-
tion, land area, and dependence on fossil fuel production.' All
criteria will have adherents, especially those with larger alloca-
tions under those criteria,5' and several criteria may therefore
need to be blended to create international consensus on emis-
sions allocations.52 Whatever the initial allocation, subsequent
trading can lead to a cost-effective outcome if transaction costs
are not significant. This potential for pursuing distributional
objectives while assuring cost-effectiveness is an important at-
tribute of the tradeable permit approach.
Countries allocated permits greater than their emission re-
quirements could use revenue from the sale of permits to in-
crease their imports relative to their exports,53 while countries
allocated permits less than their requirements would have to
reduce imports relative to exports. In this way, a tradeable per-
mit scheme would tend to reallocate world production; the alloca-
tion of tax revenue from an international carbon tax scheme
would have similar effects.
Providing large initial permits to poor countries (for reasons
of distributional equity) suggests that they would be selling per-
mits primarily to rich countries. Because permit prices represent
an implicit or explicit tax on all participating countries, the
terms of trade within the coalition for countries with the same
carbon intensities in production would remain unaffected. From a
' For an overview, see Scott Barrett, 'Acceptable" Allocations of Tradeable Carbon
Emission Entitlements in a Global Warming Treaty, in United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, Combating Global Warming: Study on a Global System of
Tradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements 85 (United Nations 1992); Geoffrey Bertram,
Tradeable Emission Permits and the Control of Greenhouse Gases, 28 J Dev Stud 324
(1992); Peter Bohm and Bjorn Larsen, Fairness in a Tradeable-Permit Treaty for Carbon
Emissions Reductions in Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 4 Envir & Resource Econ
219 (1994).
51 For example, under an allocation system related to population levels, the big
players in the market would likely be India and China, as permit sellers, and the United
States and perhaps the former Soviet Union, as buyers. See Joshua M. Epstein and Raj
Gupta, Controlling the Greenhouse Effect: Five Global Regimes Compared 20 (Brookings
1990).
52 For example, the Canadians proposed using population and GNP combined as
allocation criteria when chlorofluorocarbon ("CFC") reduction obligations were being
considered in the development of the Montreal Protocol.
Graciela Chichilinsky, Geoffrey Heal, and David Starrett, International Emission
Permits: Equity and Efficiency (mimeograph, Columbia University, Nov 1993) (on file with
author).
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distributional point of view, poor countries would receive compen-
sation, whereas rich countries would have to pay, first for their
own emission reductions as called for by the permit price and
second for permit purchases from abroad.
Inevitably, the institutional question of who would monitor
and enforce such an international program seems paramount.
Here it is useful to decompose the "monitoring and enforcement
problem" among coalition countries into three separate issues:
monitoring, enforcing violations at the margin, and maintaining
an enforcing coalition.5 First, the monitoring problem is really
quite similar for different policy instruments, and it may not
even be necessary to monitor. This is because an international
tradeable permit system-and some other instruments--could be
based on an ex ante demonstration of likely compliance, rather
than ex post validation, "5 an approach that has been used suc-
cessfully in the past in international economic agreements, if not
environmental ones. This is not to suggest that compliance prob-
lems are trivial, only that they are not necessarily insoluble.
Thus, monitoring per se need not be a great obstacle, but we
are still faced with the enforcement problem. Here, the tradeable
permit mechanism itself can help address the challenge, since
permits initially can be allocated to favor low-cost abaters, that
is, permit sellers. Such an allocation can reduce the probability of
marginal violations because it makes sellers vulnerable to en-
forcement actions by the (enforcing) coalition of countries." On
the other hand, under such an initial allocation (of permits to
low-cost controllers, which may largely be developing countries),
the incentives for the high-cost controllers (the buyers, most
likely the industrialized countries) to maintain the enforcing
coalition (the original agreement) are reduced. In the past, this
factor has contributed to the collapse of international agree-
ments. 7
" I am grateful to Bob Keohane for having pointed out the importance of this decom-
position.
' David G. Victor and Julian E. Salt, Keeping the Climate Treaty Relevant, 373 Na-
ture 280 (1995); Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architecture and Institutions
(Paper Presented for NBER Conference "Economics and Policy Issues in Global Warming:
An Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel Report," 1996).
Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics
in Transition 19-22 (Little, Brown 1977).
"' Da-Hsiang Donald Lien and Robert H. Bates, Political Behavior in the Coffee
Agreement, 35 Econ Dev & Cultural Change 629 (1987).
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E. Joint Implementation
Joint implementation ("JI"), provided for in the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, involves cooperation between two
countries, with one funding emission reduction in the other to
help the first meet its reduction commitments. 8 A number of
countries are already undertaking joint implementation pro-
jects. 9 While many of these involve intergovernmental agree-
ments, the private sector can be involved directly. The U.S. Ini-
tiative on Joint Implementation provides for governmental ap-
proval of private-sector proposals.0
The potential economic merits and demerits of joint imple-
mentation have been widely discussed.6" Joint implementation
has been promoted as potentially serving three related purposes:
(1) a first step toward establishing an international tradeable
permit system; (2) a cost-effective option for industrialized coun-
tries to finance emission reductions in developing countries; and
(3) an activity to identify when it is cost effective to bring new
emissions sources or sinks into an existing international green-
house management scheme.
Joint implementation also raises many concerns. When appli-
cations are between developed and developing countries, where
only the former commit to binding targets and the latter do not,
it will be difficult to determine the emission-reduction effects of a
specific joint-implementation project.62 The effects of low-cost
abatement projects are particularly difficult to estimate because
' For a comprehensive review of the legal and practical aspects of joint implementa-
tion, see Onno Kuik, Paul Peters, and Nico Schrijver, eds, Joint Implementation to Curb
Climate Change: Legal and Economic Aspects (Kluwer 1994).
' JI has taken on a significant "life of its own," including the creation of a number of
institutions that have been developed purely for the purpose of furthering JI projects. See
various issues of the periodical, Joint Implementation Quarterly, now in its third year of
publication (in the Netherlands).
' For a recent summary of joint implementation projects, see Alan Zollinger and
Roger Dower, Private Financing for Global Environmental Initiatives: Can the Climate
Convention's "Joint Implementation" Pave the Way?, Issues and Ideas (Oct 1996).
"I See, for example, Scott Barrett, The Strategy of Joint Implementation in the Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (United Nations 1995); Peter Bobm, On the Feasibili-
ty of Joint Implementation of Carbon Emissions Reductions in Climate Changes: Policy
Instruments and Their Implications, Proceedings of the Tsukuba Workshop of IPCC
Workshop Group Ii 181 (1994); Reinhard Loske and Sebastian Oberthdr, Joint Implemen-
tation under the Climate Change Convention, 6 Intl Envir Aff 45 (1994); Catrinus J.
Jepma, ed, The Feasibility of Joint Implementation (Kluwer 1995).
2 Thomas H. Tietenberg and David G. Victor, Implementation Issues for a Tradeable
Permit Approach to Controlling Global Warming, in Climate Changes: Policy Instruments
and Their Implications, Proceedings of the Tsukuba Workshop of IPCC Workshop Group
I11 155 (1994).
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such projects may be nearly profitable in the absence of the JI
arrangement and hence may be carried out without any policy
intervention. In general, bilateral JI efforts are hampered by
significant transaction costs and poorly defined property
rights.' Furthermore, there are significant incentives for parties
to a joint-implementation project to exaggerate a project's net
emission reduction effects. Lastly, a system of JI agreements-on
its own-would be invariably inefficient since countries would
ignore benefits to third-party nations. In other words, it would be
impossible to overcome the free-rider problem.
Although the Climate Action Plan includes an Initiative on
Joint Implementation, relatively little action has occurred in the
United States, principally because there has been no binding
emissions cap on domestic sources and thus no credit incentive in
place."
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Assessing alternative instruments for global climate change
requires us to consider implementation issues, since they can
greatly affect real world outcomes. With market-based instru-
ments, the claims made for their cost-effectiveness have in some
cases exceeded what can reasonably be anticipated. Professor
Tietenberg assimilated the results from ten analyses of the costs
of air-pollution control, and, in a frequently cited table, he indi-
cated the ratio of cost of actual regulatory programs to least-cost
benchmarks.65 Unfortunately, other people have sometimes tak-
en the resulting ratios (which range from 22.0 to 1.1) as direct
evidence of the potential gains from adopting specific market-
based instruments. A more realistic and appropriate comparison
would be between actual regulatory policies and either actual
market-based programs or reasonably constrained theoretical pro-
grams."
This also suggests that current efforts to better define property rights and reduce
transaction costs in joint implementation programs are well placed. Schmalensee, Green-
house Policy Architecture (cited in note 55). See also Kenneth R. Richards, Joint Imple-
mentation in the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Opportunities and Pitfalls, in
Charles E. Walker, Mark A. Bloomfield, and Margo Thorning, eds, An Economic Perspec-
tive on Climate Change Policies 171-93 (American Council for Capital Formation Center
for Policy Research 1996).
" Heidi Yanulis, Enviro Lauds New US Climate Change Stance, Greenwire (Oct 18,
1996).
6' Thomas H. Teitenberg; Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Station-
ary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis, 56 Land Econ 391, 411-14 (1980).
" Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental
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Several factors can adversely affect the performance of mar-
ket-based systems: concentration in the permit market; 7 con-
centration in the output market;6 transaction costs; 9 non-profit-
maximizing behavior, such as sales or staff maximization;70 the
pre-existing regulatory environment;7 the degree of monitor-
ing;7" the degree of enforcement;73 and administrative costs.7"
In the following sections, I review some of the most promi-
nent issues regarding the implementation of carbon taxes and
tradeable permit systems.
A. The Effects of Uncertainty on the Choice of Policy Instrument
In the absence of uncertainty, price instruments (such as
emission taxes) and quantity controls (such as tradeable permit
systems) are-to a large degree-equivalent in their ability to
achieve the efficient level of control. Climate change involves
many uncertainties, however. We are not yet able to determine
climate changes given different emission trajectories or the costs
and benefits of abating emissions. Hence, alternative instruments
must be compared under conditions of uncertainty.
Perhaps surprisingly, uncertainty about the benefits of
abatement does not affect the choice between a price and a quan-
tity instrument. If the marginal abatement cost function is
known, then both instruments will be equal in achieving a target
level of emission. While uncertainty about the benefits of abate-
ment will make it very difficult to choose the efficient target, one
Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 Am Econ Rev 464, 465-66 (1992).
e Robert W. Hahn, Market Power and Transferable Property Rights, 99 Q J Econ 753
(1984); Walter S. Misiolek and Harold W. Elder, Exclusionary Manipulation of Markets for
Pollution Rights, 16 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 156, 164-65 (1989).
David A. Malueg, Welfare Consequences of Emission Credit Trading Programs, 18 J
Envir Econ & Mgmt 66, 68-72 (1990)
69 Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J Envir Econ &
Mgmt 133, 137-43 (1995).
o John T. Tschirhart, Transferable Discharge Permits and Profit-Maximizing Behav-
ior, in Thomas D. Crocker, ed, Economic Perspectives on Acid Deposition Control 157, 168
(Butterworth 1984).
7' Douglas P. Bohi and Dallas Burtraw, Utility Investment Behavior and the Emission
Trading Market, 14 Resource Engineering 129 (1992).
72 Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in Paul R. Portney, ed, Public Pol-
icies for Environmental Protection 243 (Resources for the Future 1990).
" Clifford S. Russell, Winston Harrington and William J. Vaughn, Enforcing Pollu-
tion Control Laws 16-44 (Resources for the Future 1986); Andrew G. Keeler, Non-Compli-
ant Firms in Transferable Discharge Permit Markets: Some Extensions, 21 J Envir Econ &
Mgmt 180, 188-89 (1991).
"' A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Pigouvian. Taxation with Administrative
Costs, 19 J Pub Econ 385 (1982).
314 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
instrument will work as well as the other in achieving the chosen
target. Hence, the deadweight losses associated with having
chosen an inefficient target will be the same with either type of
instrument.
In contrast with such instrument symmetry in the presence
of benefit uncertainty, the difference between price and quantity
instruments can be significant when the costs of abatement are
uncertain.7" If the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions
are linear, the two instruments will be equally efficient only if
their slopes are identical (in absolute value). If the marginal cost
function is steeper than the marginal benefit function, emission
taxes will result in a more efficient outcome. Conversely, if the
slope of the marginal cost function is less than the slope of the
marginal benefit function, then tradeable permits would be pre-
ferred."
In the case of global climate change, the available evidence
seems to indicate that marginal abatement costs will be relative-
ly flat over some range, then steep once some abatement level is
exceeded.77 By contrast, little is known about how marginal
benefits will vary with the level of abatement. There is concern,
however, that at some level a threshold may exist in the damages
associated with greenhouse gas concentrations. Hence, the effects
of uncertainty on optimal (efficient) greenhouse instrument
"' A substantial literature in the context of environmental policy has followed, includ-
ing major works by Zvi Adar and James M. Griffin, Uncertainty and the Choice of Pollu-
tion Control Instruments, 3 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 178 (1976); Gary W. Yohe, Comparisons
of Price and Quantity Controls: A Survey 1 J Comp Econ 213 (1977); William D. Watson
and Ronald G. Ridker, Losses from Effluent Taxes and Quotas under Uncertainty, 11 J
Envir Econ & Mgmt 310 (1984). In theory, if a non-linear tax (equal to expected marginal
damages at each level of emissions or concentration) is feasible, then a tax (price) in-
strument dominates a quantity instrument. Marc J. Roberts and Michael Spence, Effluent
Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty 5 J Pub Econ 193, 202-04 (1976); Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation (Work-
ing Paper, Harvard Law School, 1996). Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 Rev
Econ Stud 477, 485-87 (1974).
7 Although benefit uncertainty on its own has no effect on the identity of the efficient
instrument, in the presence of simultaneous uncertainty in both marginal benefits and
marginal costs and with some statistical dependence between them, the usual "Weitzman
result" can be reversed, depending on the magnitudes of benefit and cost uncertainty and
the degree and sign of the correlation between them. Robert N. Stavins, Correlated
Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice, 30 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 218, 229-30 (1996). A
positive correlation will always tend to favor a quantity instrument, and a negative
correlation will tend to favor a price instrument.
"7 William D. Nordhaus, The Cost of Slowing Climate Changes: A Survey, 12 Energy
J 37, 61-63 (1991).
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choice will vary, depending critically on the level of national and
global targets.
B. The Currency of Regulation
Because of the monitoring and enforcement costs associated
with regulating actual carbon dioxide emissions, the most reason-
able "currency" for a tax or tradeable permit system is likely to
be the carbon content of fossil fuels. Given the proportional rela-
tionship between carbon content and CO2 emissions and the lack
of a practical way to sequester these stack gases, this seems to be
the right approach. Monitoring could rely mainly on self-report-
ing, supplemented by international access to fossil fuel invento-
ries. Under an international carbon tax or tradeable permit
scheme, a system of credible sanctions would presumably be
required to make any enforcement system effective. There is little
doubt, as I emphasize below, that in the international domain
satisfactory solutions to these monitoring and enforcement prob-
lems will be preconditions for successfully implementing any
policy instrument, be it market-based or otherwise. From this
perspective, the central challenge is to understand how a credible
and effective system of monitoring and enforcement can be estab-
lished (at reasonable cost) in the absence of a centralized authori-
ty.
7 8
C. Market Power
Tradeable permit systems raise two potential market power
problems: the potential for some economic agents to influence
permit price79 and the potential for some economic agents to use
permits to exercise market power in the output (product) mar-
ket. o Thus, the extent of competition in a tradeable permit mar-
ket will affect the degree to which potential control cost savings
are realized. A monopsonist may force the permit price below the
competitive level; or a monopolist may force the permit price
above the competitive level.81 To the extent that market power
derives from the initial allocation of permits, one solution would
Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 Intl Org 1 (1986).
79 Hahn, 99 Q J Econ 753 (cited in note 67).
Malueg, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at 68-72 (cited in note 68).
SI Misiolek and Elder, 16 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at 157-64 (cited in note 67).
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be to limit the share of permits held by any one participant. 2
One way to do this might be to adopt temporally limited permits.
Emissions taxes can also be problematic when emitters have
monopoly power.83 In principle, a monopolist in an output mar-
ket for an emissions-intensive commodity would tend to reduce
output below the competitive level in order to raise its profits.
Hence, welfare gains from reduced emissions must more than
offset welfare losses from reduced output for an emissions tax to
be worthwhile.8 Which effect dominates is an empirical issue.'
D. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs can affect the performance of tradeable
permit markets. Three possible sources of transaction costs in
tradeable permit markets can be identified: 6 research and infor-
mation; bargaining and decision; and monitoring and enforce-
ment. 7
There is abundant anecdotal evidence that some trading
programs involve significant transaction costs. Professors
Atkinson and Tietenberg surveyed six empirical studies that
found trading levels-and hence cost savings-in permit markets
to be lower than theoretical models had anticipated.8 Professor
Liroff suggests that this experience with permit systems "demon-
strates the need for... recognition of the administrative and
related transaction costs associated with transfer systems.""9
2 Thomas H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution
Policy 125-47 (Resources for the Future 1985).
James M. Buchanan, External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Struc-
ture, 59 Am Econ Rev 174, 176 (1969).
" Maureen L. Cropper and Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30
J Econ Literature 675, 700-22 (1992).
Although there is no cutoff point, it is unlikely that firms or nations could engage
in price-setting behavior if they controlled less than 10 percent of the market. Frederick
M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 282-85 (Rand
McNally 2d ed 1980). Ultimately, the question is whether other firms present credible
threats of entry to the market-that is, whether the market is "contestable." William J.
Baumol, John C. Panzar, and Robert D. Willig, Contestable Markets and the theory of
Industry Structure 191-242 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1982).
Stavins, 29 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at 134 (cited in note 69).
87 The third source of transaction costs-monitoring and enforcement-can be sig-
nificant, but these costs are typically borne by the responsible government authority and
not by trading partners, and hence do not fall within the conventional notion of transac-
tion costs incurred by firms.
" Scott Atkinson and Thomas H. Tietenberg, Market Failure in Incentive-Based
Regulation: The Case of Emissions Trading, 21 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 17, 28-29 (1991).
89 Richard A. Liroff, The Evolution of Transferable Emission Privileges in the Untied
States, (paper presented at The Workshop on Economic Mechanisms for Environmental
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For example, under the EPA's emissions trading program for
"criteria air pollutants," there is no ready means for buyers and
sellers to identify one another, and-as a result-buyers have
frequently paid substantial fees to consultants to assist in the
search for available permits." At the other extreme, the high
level of trading that took place under the program of lead rights
trading among refineries as part of the EPA's leaded gasoline
phasedown in the 1980s has been attributed to the program's
minimal administrative requirements and the fact that the po-
tential trading partners (refineries) already had experience in
striking deals with one another.9 Hence, transaction costs were
kept to a minimum and there was little need for intermediar-
ies.92 Likewise, the apparent success of the new SO2 allowance
trading program for acid rain control can be attributed partly to
the program's very low transaction costs.93 The obvious lesson
from these experiences for global climate policy is simply that
one aim of trading regimes should be to keep transaction costs
low.
E. Free-Riding and Emissions Leakage Problems
Can a unilateral policy by one country alone or by a group of
cooperating countries prove effective in abating global greenhouse
gas emissions? The answer depends on how the other (non-coop-
erating) countries respond to the policies adopted by the cooper-
ating countries. These responses in turn reflect two phenome-
na-free riding and leakage-that can undermine any interna-
tional greenhouse management initiatives, whether they be mar-
ket-based or conventional.9 Free riding arises when countries
that benefit from global abatement do not contribute toward its
provision; and leakage arises when abatement by cooperating
Protection, Jelenia Gora, Poland, 1989).
90 Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the
Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J Econ Persp 95, 97-104 (Spring 1989).
"' Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory
and Practice, 16 Ecol L Q 361, 380-91 (1989).
' Suzi Kerr and David Mare, Efficient Regulation through Tradeable Permit Markets:
The United States Lead Phasedown (University of Maryland Working Paper 96-06, 1997).
9' Juan Pablo Montero, A. Denny Ellerman, and Richard Schmalensee, The U.S.
Allowance Trading Program for Sulfur Dioxide: An Update After the First Year of Compli-
ance (paper presented for the Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Energy
Externalities, Brussels, Belgium, October 1996).
" Scott Barrett, Climate Change Policy and International Trade, in Climate Change:
Policy Instruments and Their Implications, Proceedings of the Tsukuba Workshop of IPCC
Working Group III 15 (1994).
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countries alters world relative prices in ways that lead non-coop-
erating countries to increase their emissions.
As long as participation in an international greenhouse poli-
cy is voluntary, countries will have incentives to free ride, lead-
ing to a less than optimal level of aggregate abatement.95 The
threat of a ban on trade between cooperating and non-cooperat-
ing countries in carbon-based fuels and products could work to
support full participation in a greenhouse management
scheme." Of course, a ban on trade introduces distortions in the
global economy. On the other hand, free riding is itself a distor-
tion, and if trade restrictions reduce free-riding, they may yield
positive net benefits. This issue, like so many others, invites
empirical inquiry.
There are two main channels for emissions leakage. First,
since a carbon abatement policy by cooperating countries may
shift comparative advantage in carbon-intensive goods toward
non-cooperating countries, production of such goods and emis-
sions may rise outside the coalition. Second, a unilateral policy
may lower world demand for carbon-intensive fuels and thereby
reduce the world price for such fuels traded in international
markets. As a result, demands for such fuels (and emissions) can
rise outside the coalition.97
' A number of studies have examined this issue, including Scott Barrett, Negotiating
a Framework Convention on Climate Change: Economic Considerations, in Convention on
Climate Change: Economic Aspects of Negotiations 9, 73-94 (OECD 1992); Scott Barrett,
Reaching a CO, Emission Limitation Agreement for the Community: Implications for
Equity and Cost-Effectiveness, VOL European Econ 3, 20-22 (1992); Scott Barrett, 'Accept-
able" Allocations of Tradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements in a Global Warming Treaty,
in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Combating Global Warming:
Study on a Global System of Tradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements 85 (United Nations
1992); Peter Bohm and Bjorn Larsen, Fairness in a Tradeable-Permit Treaty for Carbon
Emissions Reductions in Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 4 Envir & Resource Econ
219 (1994).; Michael Hoel, International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform
Reductions of Emissions; J Envir & Resource Econ 141 (1992); Edward A. Parson and
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Cooperation in the Unbalanced Commons, in Kenneth J. Arrow, et
al, eds, Barriers to Conflict Resolution 212-34 (Norton 1995). In spite of free-rider in-
centives, a stable coalition of cooperating countries may exist. See Michael Hoel,
Harmonization of Carbon Taxes in International Climate Agreements, 3 Envir & Resource
Econ 221 (1993); Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco, Strategies for the International
Protection of the Environment, 52 J Pub Econ 309, 323-28 (1993). The size of the coalition
depends on the ability of cooperating countries to punish countries that would withdraw.
Barrett, Climate Change Policy and International Trade (cited in note 94).
'7 There is a third possible channel for leakage transmission. Under certain condi-
tions, non-cooperating countries will abate their emissions up to the point where their
own marginal benefit of abatement equals their own marginal cost of abatement. Scott
Barrett, The Strategy of Joint Implementation in the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (United Nations 1995). Non-cooperating countries will abate their emissions by
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What can be done to reduce emissions leakage? If the coali..
tion is a net importer (exporter) of carbon-intensive products in
the absence of a carbon tax, then a tariff (subsidy) imposed on
these net imports (exports) can reduce emissions leakage through
the terms of trade. But the tariff (subsidy) would have to be set
proportionately to the carbon-intensity of every product, a clearly,
impractical approach. Further, whether the welfare losses (distor.
tions) caused by the tariffs would be greater or less than the
welfare losses reduced by cutting emissions leakage remains an
open empirical question. Finally, such border tax adjustments
pose a number of other problems, not the least of which is possi-
ble conflict with existing multilateral trading rules. 8
In general, the potential problems of free-riding and emis-
sions leakage are reminders of the importance of compliance
issues and of expanding membership in the active coalition in
any international agreement, whether political, economic, or
environmental. More broadly, these problems are yet another
example of the centrality of institutional issues in the global
climate policy domain, a point to which I return below.
V. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF GREENHOUSE POLICY
INSTRUMENTS
This section begins by comparing conventional regulations
and market-based systems for addressing global climate change.
I find that market-based systems are particularly well adapted to
the problems that climate change presents, but they raise two
further questions. How do domestic tradeable permit systems
compare with domestic tax systems? And how do international
tradeable permit systems compare with international tax sys-
tems?
less than they would if they cooperated. Where non-cooperating countries undertake
positive unilateral abatement, and where the marginal benefit of abatement to non-
cooperating countries decreases with the level of global abatement, an increase in
abatement by cooperating countries will create an incentive for non-cooperating countries
to reduce their abatement. Hence, leakage may occur even in the absence of trade.
" World Trade Organization ("WTO") rules allow for border tax adjustments where
the taxed or controlled inputs are physically incorporated in the final product, but in the
case of greenhouse gases, the concern is with the carbon emitted in the process of manu-
facturing. The Uruguay Round allows energy taxes to be remitted on exports of manufac-
tured goods, although there is some question about the generality of this provision and
whether it could be extended to include impdrts.
320 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
A. Comparing Regulatory Systems and Market-Based
Instruments
Even the most optimistic estimates indicate that the cost of
addressing the threat of global climate change will be exception-
ally great.9 Hence, the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative
policy instruments is of central importance. If governments had
complete information about the marginal costs of abatement at
each and every source, they could employ conventional regulatory
policies to minimize total abatement costs. But since govern-
ments do not have such information and can acquire it only at
great cost, if at all, regulatory approaches will generally not be
cost-effective. In contrast, market-based policy instruments-such
as charges and tradeable permits-will, in theory, be cost-effec-
tive.
Despite the fairly clear abatement-cost advantages of mar-
ket-based instruments, we should not neglect the public as well
as the private costs of control. That is, the total costs minimized
by a truly cost-effective environmental policy instrument should
include both the costs of abatement (typically borne by private
industry and including transaction costs) and the costs of admin-
istration (typically borne by government in the form of monitor-
ing and enforcement costs). When monitoring and enforcement
needs are particularly burdensome, performance-based stan-
dards-whether market-based or command-and-control-may not
be cost-effective. In addition to such concerns about static or
allocative cost-effectiveness, it is important to consider how alter-
native policy instruments may affect the invention, innovation,
and diffusion of new technologies. That is, in the long term, the
dynamic efficiency properties of environmental policy instru-
ments are likely to be the most important.
In the international context, monitoring and enforcement
requirements would hardly differ among major instruments since
fossil-fuel output plus imports minus exports would have to be
reported for each participating country under any system. In
terms of dynamic efficiency-as well as static cost-effective-
ness-the advantages of market-based instruments are striking.
Additionally, taxes and, to some degree, auctioned permits will
make the costs of climate-change protection more visible to pri-
vate industry and thus to the general public. For political rea-
" John P. Weyant, Costs of Reducing Global Carbon Emissions, 7 J Econ Persp 27,
42-43 (Fall 1993).
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sons, this awareness may be strategically problematic in the
short term, but in the long term it has the advantage of clearly
signaling and educating the public about the real tradeoffs asso-
dated with various levels of greenhouse control.
B. Comparing Domestic Tradeable Permits and Domestic Taxes
If market-based instruments are indeed preferable in the
domestic context because they are cost-effective, then charge
systems must be compared with tradeable permit instruments. In
principle, with no uncertainty, no fundamental difference exists
between domestic carbon taxes and tradeable carbon permits
from an aggregate cost-effectiveness or distributional point of
view. Auctioned permits are virtually identical in those regards
with a proportional tax; and grandfathered permits are identical
with a tax linked with particular lump-sum refunds to regulated
firms. This symmetry between taxes and permits begins to break
down, however, in the presence of uncertainty, transaction costs,
and other market imperfections, as well as when political feasi-
bility is seriously considered. In particular, the lack of control
over emission levels with taxes could be a distinct disadvantage
in an international agreement. Taxes would have to be varied
because of inadequate information to determine the appropriate
tax level. Furthermore, adjustments would need to respond to
changes in economic activity and relative price levels. Finally,
although permit systems are more compatible with quantity-
based targets, they may be more susceptible than tax systems to
strategic behavior. As indicated above, however, tradeable permit
schemes can be designed to reduce these effects.
The final choice will likely depend on political factors. And
here, the political system in the United States, at least, has re-
vealed its strong preferences for quantity instruments in their
grandfathered form.Y As indicated previously, however, these
instruments distribute scarcity rents to the private sector and
hence exacerbate pre-existing distortions in the economy. Ironi-
cally, it is precisely because of this rent distribution that
grandfathered permits have found political favor. Thus, the pre-
ferred domestic greenhouse instrument in the United States in
the short run may be grandfathered tradeable permits and, in
the long run, revenue-neutral carbon taxes.
100 Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation:
A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 Ecol L Q 1, 5-7 (1991).
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C. Comparing International Tradeable Permits and
International Tax Systems
In the international context, market-based systems are clear-
ly superior. Which incentive-based instrument is most effective,
however, will depend on a number of factors.
A system of harmonized domestic carbon taxes would require
an agreement about compensatory international financial trans-
fers as well as the pre-carbon-tax net tax rates on fossil fuels. At
best, internationally acceptable estimates of these basic tax levels
would be difficult to establish. Moreover, no design seems feasi-
ble and generally acceptable when its participants are not al-
lowed to undertake policies on their own that affect fossil fuel
use such as levying a tax on substitutes to carbon and subsidiz-
ing complements to carbon. Thus, there is some likelihood that a
tax harmonization agreement would either fail to be adopted or
fail after implementation.
A system of international taxes where all participating coun-
tries were liable for a given carbon tax could include an agree-
ment on how tax receipts would be shared among the partici-
pants. Under such a system countries might retain all or part of
the taxes raised domestically, and some participants (low income
countries) might receive a transfer. Although each country would
know the amount of tax revenue likely to be raised internally,
less information would be available about other countries' tax
revenues. Hence, there would be uncertainty about the size of net
transfers among countries. Most important, it is difficult to imag-
ine what existing international institution could impose and
enforce such as system.
Some of these same institutional barriers would face an
international tradeable permit scheme, but such an approach-if
implemented---could allow each participating country to decide
what domestic policy to use.'01 Such a scheme, moreover, would
not require any ongoing side payments. Instead, the initial allo-
cation of permits among countries would reflect distributional
considerations. On the other hand, endogenous future prices in
international permit trade would be unknown at the time an
agreement on the allocation was reached. Hence, the
distributional implications could not be fully known beforehand.
"01 Strictly speaking, only domestic quantity instruments could guarantee that some
quantity goal would be met. The point is that a system of international tradeable permits
gives individual nations more leeway in choosing domestic instruments than does an
international tax system.
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This is the price paid for the key advantage of such a scheme,
namely that global emissions will be known in advance for a
global agreement, and net of carbon leakage will be known for a
non-global agreement. Thus, the weight of evidence would appear
to favor-in the long term-a permit scheme over a charge sys-
tem at the international level.0 2 In the short term, however,
political problems-in particular, the lack of an adequate institu-
tional structure-would appear to make it highly unlikely that a
global permit trading program will be adopted by the community
of nations."3
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Nations will need to consider a wide variety of factors before
they can identify their optimal (and feasible) portfolios of green-
house policy instruments. Countries differ dramatically in their
institutional structures, their resource endowments, and their
levels of industrialization. Their policymakers will invariably
consider alternative instruments in intensely political environ-
ments.
The choice of policy instruments at the international level
could affect the likelihood of reaching an agreement because the
adoption of any such instruments will affect the distribution of
wealth among countries. Hence, debates and negotiations about
distributional issues are likely to be central to determining the
final portfolio of policies.
On the domestic level, even the most cost-effective green-
house policy instrument will be desirable only if the national
target it seeks to achieve is part of an accepted set of internation-
al mandates. Because unilateral action will invariably be highly
inefficient, any domestic program requires an effective interna-
tional agreement, if not a set of international greenhouse policy
instruments. This brings us back to the international context,
where we are faced with the awesome task of identifying (or,
more likely, creating) an institutional framework for achieving
"o For a review of legal issues pertaining to the implementation of an international
greenhouse gas trading system, see Richard B. Stewart, Jonathan B. Wiener, and Phillipe
Sands, Legal Issues Presented by a Pilot International GHG Trading System Final Report
Prepared under UNCTAD Emissions Trading Project (NYU School of Law 1996).
1"3 This is not to deny that significant elements within the Clinton Administration in
the United States are firmly committed to developing an international emissions trading
or joint implementation system that is "credible, efficient, transparent, and verifiable."
Hambley, U.S. Submission on Elements of a New Legal Instrument (prepared for the
Climate Convention Secretariat and the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate 1996).
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agreement among nations and for credibly administering any
program.
104
A. A "Broad, Then Deep" Time-Path for Goals, Institutions, and
Policy Instruments
As I emphasized at the outset, it is generally acknowledged
that tremendous uncertainty characterizes both the future dam-
ages of greenhouse warming and the costs of avoiding or adapt-
ing to such warming. Because much of this uncertainty may be
resolved gradually over time, it is important to consider alter-
native time-paths of public policies, which might feature "insur-
ance policies" in earlier years and more aggressive abatement
policies later on. Furthermore, because the creation of a satisfac-
tory institutional framework is a precondition for the successful
implementation of any international policy instrument (and, as
argued above, for the enactment of a serious domestic program),
it is also important to consider time-paths for developing institu-
tions that can implement such policies.
There are compelling arguments for beginning with broad-
based (if not global) agreements that require only low-cost mea-
sures to achieve moderate goals with relatively unsophisticated
instruments. As appropriate institutions develop and as we learn
more about the benefits and costs of addressing climate change,
there might be an evolution toward more ambitious goals, requir-
ing higher-cost measures, achieved (cost-effectively) with more
sophisticated policy instruments. This is the "broad, then deep"
policy architecture that Professor Schmalensee °s and-by im-
plication-Professor Schelling have proposed."°
This "broad, then deep" strategy is similar to the approach
frequently taken to address other kinds of. international prob-
lems. For example, if one were to seek the eventual peaceful
coexistence of Israelis and Palestinians, a reasonable first step
might simply be to bring the parties together; in this case, bring-
ing all of the relevant interest groups into a single room would be
a "broad, but shallow" first step. As institutions develop, more
Further, the international domain inescapably links considerations of cost-effective
instruments with the difficult question of the desirable degree of greenhouse action, a
question that is ignored at the risk of "designing fast trains to the wrong station."
'" Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architecture and Institutions (Paper
Presented for NBER Conference "Economics and Policy Issues in Global Warming: An
Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel Report," 1996).
"0 Thomas C. Schelling, Some Economics of Global Warming, 82 Am Econ Rev 1, 11-
14 (1992).
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ambitious targets might be adopted, but still ones that would be
relatively low-cost to achieve, such as more efficient and equita-
ble allocation of scarce water supplies or support for movement of
tourists. Only later, after the relevant parties were more comfort-
able working with one another and after credible implementing:
institutions had come into being, would truly ambitious goals
(such as the location of settlements and ultimate authority of
governments) be adopted that-by necessity-would require (po-.
litically) high-cost strategies and potentially complex implement-
ing instruments.
So too, in the case of global climate change, reasonable first;
steps should involve the broad participation of many nations;
(presumably including, at the very least, the countries in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"), as well as China, Russia, and India) in low-cost;
agreements, which could later be made more ambitious (and.
costly), as appropriate. The default alternative would be to begin
with narrow participation by a limited set of countries (most;
likely, some subset of the OECD) in a relatively ambitious agree-
ment that involves considerable costs and hence requires fairly
sophisticated policy instruments. Examples of this approach
include some proposals for ambitious harmonized taxes and JI
programs among European nations.'
Potentially severe free-rider and emissions-leakage problems,
together with other implementation concerns discussed above,
are among the reasons why a default "deep, then broad" strategy
would be unlikely to succeed. Emissions leakage induced by a
bilateral or narrowly multilateral greenhouse agreement means
that the very existence of an effective multilateral agreement can
make it more difficult to formulate a global agreement. This is
because such an initial greenhouse agreement would cause non-
participant countries to increase their economic specialization in
107 For a review of such proposals, see B.S. Fisher, et al, An Economic Assessment of'
Policy Instruments for Combating Climate Change, in James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, and
Erik F. Haites, eds, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate
Change 397 (Cambridge 1996). At the July 1996 climate change meeting in Geneva,
Switzerland, the United States initially proposed a completely open regime on joint imple-
mentation and emissions trading, but the Chinese and Indian delegations objected. The
result was that the proposal was revised to include only Annex I countries, a list from the
Framework Convention on Climate Change that consists essentially of the OECD coun-
tries plus the former Soviet Union. Dale Curtis, How Utilities View Latest Climate Policy
Moves, Greenwire (Oct 17, 1996).
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carbon-intensive production, and thus to be even more resistant
than previously to joining any future agreements."8
Furthermore, the severe enforcement problems that charac-
terize the global climate policy realm suggest another advantage
of the "broad, then deep" approach. Successful collaborative
agreements-in the absence of some kind of low-cost, effective
enforcement regimes-require substantial degrees of mutual
confidence, which is typically fostered through increased interac-
tion over time.'O°
B. Positive Political Economy: Political Barriers to Better Policy
Instruments
Turning from normative to positive considerations, we may
reflect on the fact that despite thirty years of normative argu-
ments from economists, the U.S. political system has typically
taken a command-and-control regulatory approach, rather than
an economic incentive-based approach, to environmental prob-
lems."' Why has this been the case? First, in terms of the de-
mand for environmental regulation by interest groups, private
industry clearly prefers command-and-control standards to auc-
tioned permits and taxes. Standards produce rents, while auc-
tioned permits and taxes require firms to pay not only abatement
costs to reduce pollution to a specified level, but also costs of
polluting up to that level. Environmental interest groups also
tend to prefer command-and-control instruments, for
philosophical, strategic, and technical reasons. In terms of the
supply of environmental regulatory options, command-and-control
standards are also typically preferred by legislators: their train-
ing and experience makes them more comfortable with a direct
standards approach; standards tend to hide the costs of pollution
control while emphasizing the benefits; and standards may offer
greater opportunities for symbolic politics."' These factors have
'0' See Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architecture (cited in note 105).
' Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 Intl Org 1 (1986);
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J Democracy 65,
73-74 (1995); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action 43-45, 185-92 (Cambridge 1990).
"0 Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation:
A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 Ecol L Q 1, 5-7 (1991)
. Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, and Robert R. Stavins, The Positive
Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy, in Paul Portney and
Robert Schwab, eds, Environmental Economics and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of
Wallace Oates (Edward Elgar 1997).
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led to twenty-five years of resistance to market-based policy in-
struments in the United States and to the predominance of com-
mand-and-control regulation for a host of environmental prob-
lems. There is no reason to think that these factors will be any
less important in affecting the domestic choice of policy in-
struments for global climate change.
CONCLUSION
The current situation suggests that despite the great theoret-
ical advantages of market-based approaches to addressing global
climate change, in terms of static cost-effectiveness, dynamic
efficiency, and distributional equity, the domestic political barri-
ers to this set of policy instruments should not be underestimat-
ed, nor should the severe institutional challenges that character-
ize the international domain. The ultimate test of any green-
house policy instrument-whether domestic or internation-
al-will be whether it is scientifically effective, economically
rational, and politically feasible.
Where does this leave us in terms of an agenda for future
research, at least within the social sciences? First of all, econom-
ics, as a discipline, can continue to play a central role by helping
formulate and address questions about appropriate greenhouse
targets and cost-effective and equitable instruments to achieve
those targets. But if some of the greatest barriers to progress in
dealing with the threat of global climate change are political
hurdles domestically and institutional challenges internationally,
we should be modest-to say the least-about the likelihood of
analytical dominance by economics. The profession is simply less
suited to address political and institutional dimensions of the cli-
mate change problem, both because of the nature of the analyti-
cal tools of economics and because of professional incentives with-
in the discipline that tend to work against institutional research,
particularly when it is of a qualitative nature. Instead, this is an
area where economists can learn from their colleagues in political
science and law. Over the past several decades, legal scholarship
and political science have been significantly influenced by eco-
nomics. Now, global climate change policy-with its centrally
important political and institutional features-presents an oppor-
tunity for that favor to be repaid.
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Table 1
Taxonomy of Costs of Environmental Regulation
Government Administration of Environmental Statutes and
Regulations
Monitoring
Enforcement
Private Sector Compliance Expenditures
Capital
Operating
Other Direct Costs
Legal and Other Transactional Costs
Shifted Management Focus
Disrupted Production
Negative Costs
Natural Resource Inputs
Worker Health
Innovation Stimulation
General Equilibrium Effects
Product Substitution
Discouraged Investment
Retarded Innovation
Transition Costs
Unemployment
Obsolete Capital
Social Impacts
Loss of Middle-Class Jobs
Economic Security Impacts
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Table 2
Taxonomy of Policy Instruments for Global Climate Change
DOMESTIC INSTRUMENTS
A. Command-and-Control and Voluntary Instruments
Energy efficiency standards
Product prohibitions
Voluntary agreements
B. Market-Based Instruments
1. Charges, Fees, and Taxes
Carbon taxes
BTU taxes on fossil fuels; other energy taxes
2. Tradeable Rights
Tradeable carbon rights
Tradeable "emission reduction" credits
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
A. Command-and Control Instruments
Uniform energy efficiency standards
Fixed national emission limits
B. Market-Based Instruments
1. Charges, Fees, and Taxes
Harmonized domestic taxes
Uniform international tax
2. Tradeable Rights
International tradeable permits
Joint implementation

